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RECENT CASES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-NOTICE REQUIREMENT
TRATIVE

PROCEDURE ACT SECTION

4 APPLIES To

OF ADMINIS-

ANTmUMPING

PROCEEDINGS

After an investigation conducted pursuant to the Antidumping Act of
1921,1 the Acting Secretary of the Treasury determined that hardboard
from Sweden had been imported into the United States and sold at less
than its fair market value and that the other statutory preconditions 2 to a
finding of dumping had been satisfied. During the investigation which led
to this finding, Treasury Department officials had received analytical data
from Swedish hardboard suppliers and similar information from the
domestic industry; the Department had also consulted with the Swedish
Embassy as well as with plaintiff and other importers. However, no notice
of the investigation was published in the Federal Register prior to the announcement of the finding of dumping, nor did that announcement state
that the giving of notice would have been impractical, unnecessary, or
contrary to the public interest. 3 Plaintiff importer, against whom a special
dumping duty had been levied, 4 contended that inasmuch as the finding of
dumping was rulemaking within the purview of the Administrative Procedure Act,5 the investigation should have been conducted in accordance
with the procedures there specified, and that failure to observe the APA's
requirement of public notice invalidated the Treasury Department's finding.
The Customs Court, reversing the trial court's determination that the APA
was not applicable to dumping proceedings, held, first, that the Treasury
Department is an agency when conducting dumping proceedings and subject
to the APA; second, that a finding of dumping is rulemaking which demands prior public notice; and third, that nonpublication of notice vitiated
the finding. Elof Hansson, Inc. v. United States, 178 F. Supp. 922

(C.C.P.A. 1959).
1Antidumping Act, 1921, ch. 14, § 201, 42 Stat. 11 (now Act of Sept. 1, 1954,
68 Stat. 1138, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1958)). The pertinent sections of the
statute
2 were amended in 1954 after the instant case arose but before decision.
"Dumping" refers to the determination that a domestic industry is being or is
likely to be injured by reason of the importation of goods which have been or are
being sold at less than their fair value. See Antidumping Act, 1921, § 201(a), 42 Stat.
11, as amended, 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1958).
8Administrative Procedure Act § 4(a), 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003(a)
(1958): "General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal
Register (unless all persons subject thereto are named and either personally served
or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law) ....
Except where
notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection shall not apply . . . in any
situation in which the agency for good cause finds . . . that notice and public procedure thereon are inpracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest."
4 Pursuant to Antidumping Act, 1921, ch. 14, § 202, 42 Stat. 11.
5 Administrative Procedure Act §§ 1-11, 60 Stat. 237 (1946), as amended, 5 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-11 (1958), 50 U.S.C. App. § 1900 (1958), 5 U.S.C. § 1105 (Supp. 1959).
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Under the APA, agencies proposing to conduct rulemaking proceedings are required to give public notice,8 and section 4(b) provides that
the agency "shall afford interested persons an opportunity to participate
in the rule making..
." The purpose of this section is to enable those
who must live with the proposed rule to present data and opinion as to its
content Z-the result being, hopefully, a rule grounded in the best informed
judgment available. Cabinet officers acting pursuant to congressional
8
directives have been held to be performing in an administrative capacity,
and compliance with the procedural safeguards, including notice, embodied
in the authorizing statutes has been held prerequisite to valid action by such
officers. 9 The only provision as to notice contained in the authorizing
statute involved in the instant case is that after investigation the Secretary
"shall make such finding public to the extent he deems necessary...
." 1
Prior to the APA, it had been held that one who had participated in hearings upon a proposed rule could not later invoke a lack of required public
notice to invalidate that rule."- But under the APA-at least where
criminal sanctions are involved-absence of published notice of rulemaking
proceedings or of the resulting rule may mean invalidation even when
the objecting party has had actual notice of the proposed rulemaldng.' 2
6 Administrative Procedure Act § 4(a), 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1003(a)
(1958). See note 3 supra.
7

See

26 (1947).

ATTORNEY

GENERAL'S

MANUAL ON THE ADmINISTRATIVE PROcnuRE ACT

s Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 18 (1939)

(secretary of agriculture); United

States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 521 (1911) (secretary of agriculture); Oceanic
Steam Nay. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 335 (1909) (secretary of commerce);
Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907) (secretary of war); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904) (secretary of the treasury). These cases
dealt with the power of Congress to delegate authority to these officers.
9United States v. Rock Royal Co-op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 576 (1939); Union
Bridge Co. v. United States, mspra note 8; cf. Hotch v. United States, 212 F.2d 280,
283-84 (9th Cir. 1954). For purposes similar to those of the Antidumping Act,
Congress has delegated to the President power to regulate tariffs. See J. W. Hampton,
Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). Here again the validity of the
regulations promulgated- under the delegated power has been measured in terms of
compliance with the authorizing legislation. See Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. United
States, 275 F.2d 472, 481-82 (C.C.P.A. 1959); William A. Foster & Co. v. United
States, 20 C.C.P.A. (Customs) 15, 22 (1932) ("when he acts, he must act within
the limits defined by the law"). See also Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United States, 23 C.C.P.A.
(Customs) 7,76 F.2d 412 (1935).
'0Antidumping Act, 1921, ch. 14, § 201 (a), 42 Stat. 11.
11 Quaker Oats Co. v. Federal Sec. Adm'r, 129 F.2d 76 (7th Cir.), rev'd on
other grounds, 318 U.S. 218 (1942). And under the Administrative Procedure Act,
it has been said that "wherever it appears that the absence of notice has resulted in
prejudice to a complaining party the action of the administrative agency will be set
aside. . . . But no prejudice is shown where . . .the party complaining had actual
notice of and participated in the administrative proceedings and he will not be heard
to complain of the failure to give formal notice." Florida Citrus Comm'n v. United
States, 144 F.Supp. 517, 521 (N.D.Fla. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 352 U.S. 1021 (1957).
12 Hotch v.United States, 212 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1954); cf. Pinkett v.United
States, 105 F.Supp. 67, 70 (D.Md. 1952), where parties who were not served with
formal notice but who nevertheless had attended an ICC hearing on the issuance of
a certificate of public convenience and necessity successfully enjoined the issuance
of the certificate on the grounds that "parties that might be affected by the issuance
of the proposed certificate had no notice of the application." Compare United States

v.Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950); Owensboro On The Air, Inc. v.United
States, 262 F.2d 702, 708-09 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959)
(sufficiency of published notice).
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Having concluded that the Secretary of the Treasury had acted in an
administrative capacity and that his finding of dumping-with its consequent tariff increase-was rulemaldng,13 the court in the instant case reasoned that lack of notice required reversal because "all members of the
general public who have imported or may import hardboard from Sweden
or are or may be domestic manufacturers thereof" 14 were affected by the
rule. Despite representation of these groups in the Treasury's investigation, the court felt that the interests of those who might have wished to
present their views but were unable to do so because of non-notification of
the proceedings were significant enough to require reversal. But the
question which the court failed to meet directly-a question emphasized by
section 10(e) of the APA calling for due regard to the rule of prejudicial
error 15 -was whether this plaintiff should be able to invalidate the rule
after its promulgation even though he had been consulted and been allowed
to submit correspondence and documents during the investigation? 16 Or,
more generically, did or could the party appealing the irregularity have
raised his objection in time for cure during the rulemaldng proceedings?
In United States v. L. A4. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc.,17 the Supreme

Court considered whether the defective appointment of an agency examiner
was sufficient cause to invalidate an order issued upon his recommendation. Objection to the irregularity of the examiner's appointment was
not raised until the proceedings had reached the district court upon a petition to set aside the order. Noting that if the agency had overruled an
objection to the examiner's competency made during the hearing the order
would have been invalid, the Court held that, since the objection was not
raised until appeal, the defect was "not one which deprives the Commission
of power or jurisdiction, so that even in the absence of timely objection its
order should be set aside as a nullity." 18
The opinion in the instant case fails not only to allude to timeliness
of objection but also to mention, even in passing, when objection was first
13 Both conclusions implement the apparent purpose of the APA. See H.R. REP.
No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1946) : "In the 'rule making' (that is, 'legislative')
function it provides that with certain exceptions agencies must publish notice and at
least permit interested parties to submit their views in writing for agency consideration before the issuance of general regulations (sec. 4)"; Schwartz, The Adininistrative Procedure Act in Operation, 20 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1173, 1174 (1954): "It appears
clearly to have been the intent of the draftsmen of the APA to have that statute
apply uniformly, insofar as it was possible, to the entire administrative process." See
also ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISxRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT 26
(1947).
14 Instant case at 930.
15 The court reasoned that § 10 (e) was not meant to abrogate the express requirement of notice of § 4. As far as questions of notice are concerned, however, this interpretation seems to give no effect whatsoever to the provisions of § 10(e). But see
United States ex rel. Lindenau v. Watkins, 73 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on
other grounds mub nor. United States ex rel. Paetau v. Watkins, 164 F.2d 457 (2d
Cir. 1947). The vulnerability of the courtes easy dismissal of § 10(e) increases in
the context of the issue of seasonable objection. See notes 17-23 infra and accompanying text.
16 See instant case at 924.
344 U.S. 33 (1952).
18 Id.at 38.
17
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made. If the importer had objected during the Treasury's investigation,
reversal would be in order as the best way to insure that the objecting party
receives whatever representative assistance might be gained from those not
notified, and would also serve to deter an agency's deliberate flaunt or
mistaken avoidance of APA safeguards. 19 However, if the importer failed
to object to the irregularity at the agency level, Tucker Truck calls for a
denial of relief upon appeal. 20 The importer received actual notice of and
did in fact participate in the investigation. The court assumed that his
interests were not prejudiced by the failure to publish notice.21 If there
were an unrepresented interest whose data and views might have strengthened the importer's case, it is likely that he would have been aware of this
and would have demanded that notice be given. But in any event the
court's concern for vaguely defined, unrepresented interests is premature,
for the policy of APA section 4 would not permit application of the rule to
one who was unable to present his views because of a lack of published
notice.22 By focusing upon these hypothetical interests and ordering reversal to afford them unnecessary protection, the court enabled what might
have been mere dilatory tactics of the importer to upset rulemaking proceedings which had evidently been fair to him. The decision is in accord
with Tucker Truck only if the importer had in fact seasonably objected
during the agency proceedings, for as the Court said in that case: "Simple
fairness to those who are engaged in the tasks of administration, and to
litigants, requires as a general rule that courts should not topple over
administrative decisions unless the administrative body not only has erred
but has erred against objection made at the time appropriate under its
practice." 23

EMINENT

DOMAIN-COMPNSATION FOR IMPAIRMENT
ACCESS IN CONVERSION OF HIGHWAYS TO LIMITED ACCESS

OF

Defendants owned a motel, abutting a state highway and consisting of
three duplex units and the owners' residence. The state highway commission, intending to convert the highway to a limited-access facility, condemned part of defendants' land, including the residence and one of the
duplex units. The state's plans contemplated the construction of a frontage
road that would give defendants access to the new highway at points 170 feet
west and approximately one mile east of their remaining property. The trial
court assessed an award which included severance damages to the remain19 See Note, 6 STAN. L. REv. 693, 700-07 (1954).
20 See Adams v. Witmer, 271 F.2d 29 (9th Cir. 1958) ; Elbow Lake Co-op. Grain
Co. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 144 F. Supp. 54 (D. Minn. 1956), aff'd, 251 F.2d
633 (8th Cir. 1958); Monumental Motor Tours, Inc. v. United States, 110 F. Supp.
929 (D. Md. 1953); cf. Federal Power Comm'n v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 348
U.S. 492 (1955).
21 Instant case at 930.
22
Hotch v. United States, 212 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1954).
23 344

U.S. at

37.
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ing land based wholly on evidence of defendants' impaired access. The Supreme Court of Arizona affirmed, holding that access to the highway by an
abutting property owner is an easement, that such a property right differs in
kind from that of the general public, and that its substantial impairment is
an exercise of eminent domain for which compensation must be paid. Frontage roads and alternate means of ingress and egress may be considered in
mitigation of damages but do not relieve the state of its obligation to compensate for the impairment of access. State ex rel. Morrisson v. Thelberg,
87 Ariz. 318, 350 P.2d 988 (1960).
In an analogous factual situation, defendants were the owner and
corporate lessee of property abutting a state highway. The lessee constructed and operated a gas station which was connected to the highway
by driveways. The state highway commission, pursuant to a plan to convert the highway to a limited-access freeway, condemned a strip of land
which included the driveways for use as a frontage or access road running
parallel to the new highway. The trial court had awarded damages to both
the lessor and the lessee based in part upon the diversion of traffic away
from the premises, and the highway commission admitted on appeal that,
because the nearest access to the new highway would be more than one
mile away, defendant corporation's business would be virtually eliminated.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas modified the judgment and reduced the
award to cover only the value of the land actually taken, holding that as
long as alternate access is available, there is no damage to the property
right of ingress and egress, and that since there is no property right in the
traffic in front of one's premises, damage resulting from the diversion
of such traffic-a valid exercise of the state's police power-is noncompensable.' State Highway Comm'n v. Bingham, 333 S.W.2d 728 (Ark.
1960).
These cases reflect the two lines of reasoning available to courts in
treating the question of compensation for impairment of access when an
existing highway is changed to a limited-access freeway. It has been held
in somewhat similar cases that the rerouting of traffic in the interest of
public safety is a valid exercise of the police power of the state and that,
therefore, compensation need not be paid for "mere circuity of travel" or
"diversion of traffic" resulting from that power's exercise.2 But where
1A possible factual distinction between the two cases arises in that the motel
owner lost 50% of his physical improvements while the gas station owners retained
theirs substantially intact. The Arizona court emphasized that the highest and best
use of the motel land was reduced to low class residential. But the factual distinction
is one without legal significance: all eminent domain valuations are based on present
or highest and best use and, when the gas station's business was virtually eliminated,
that property's highest and best use was also reduced.
2 Circuity of travel: Warren v. State Highway Comm'n, 250 Iowa 473, 93 N.W.2d
60 (1958) (highway closing); State Highway Comm'n v. Smith, 248 Iowa 869, 82
N.W.2d 755 (1957) (no left turn); Jones Beach Blvd. Estate v. Moses, 268 N.Y.
362, 197 N.E. 313 (1935) (prohibition of left turn required five-mile circuitous route) ;
Lindley v. Turnpike Authority, 262 P.2d 159 (Okla. 1953) (highway closing).
Diversion of traffic: Department of Pub. Works v. Ayon, 352 P.2d 519 (Cal. 1960)
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a highway is converted to limited access, the weight of authority holds that
an abutting owner's right of direct ingress and egress is an easement and,
as such, is compensable when taken or substantially impaired through that
conversion.3 Implementing this second theory are the doctrines that in all
cases of partial taking, a state must compensate not only for the land actually taken but also for severance damages to the land remaining in the
owner's possession, 4 and that severance damages are to be assessed in terms
of before-and-after market value.5
(median strip) ; People v. Sayig, 101 Cal. App. 2d 890, 226 P.2d 702 (Dist. Ct. App.
1951) (median strip); State Highway Comn'n v. Smith, supra; Langley Shopping
Center, Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n, 213 Md. 230, 131 A.2d 690 (1957) (median
strip) ; State v. Peterson, 134 Mont. 52, 328 P.2d 617 (1958) (new highway) ; State
ex rel. Merritt v. Linzell, 163 Ohio St. 97, 126 N.E.2d 53 (1955) (relocation of
highway). "Circuity of travel" and "diversion of traffic" mean essentially the same
thing in cases of impaired access: a forced change in route between highway and
property. The difference between them is one of usage: diversion-implying access
from highway to property-is likely to be used in commercial settings, while circuity
-looking from property to highway-is employed in residential contexts. Diversion
of traffic used in its more generic sense includes any change in traffic flow on a
given highway, not necessarily connected with impairment of access, as when a
highway is vacated, a median strip erected, or turns prohibited.
3
People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943) ; State ex rel. Rich v.
Fonburg, 80 Idaho 269, 328 P.2d 60 (1958) ; Department of Pub. Works & Bldgs.
v. Wolf, 414 Ill. 386, 111 N.E.2d 322 (1953); Smith v. State Highway Comm'n, 185
Kan. 445, 346 P.2d 259 (1959) ; Nichols v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 581, 121 N.E.2d
56 (1954) ; Carney v. State Highway Comm'n, 233 Miss. 598, 103 So. 2d 413 (1958) ;
McMoran v. State, 345 P.2d 598 (Wash. 1959). Since the decision in Sauer v. New
York, 206 U.S. 536 (1906), it has generally been stated that an abutter does not have
an easement of access at every point along his property, but a right of reasonable
access or access suited to the use to which the owner is putting his land. This rule
delimits the access to which an abutter is entitled and allows state regulation of the
number of points of access from a given piece of land.
4 Severance damages are given in one of three ways: as a separate award for
damages to the remaining property, in the computation of the value of the land taken
which is judged in reference to the previous whole, or by using the general formula
of value before less value after taking which reflects severance damages in the aftervalue. 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 48-53 (1953). In cases
of impairment of abutters' access rights through conversion to a limited-access highway, there will almost always be a question of severance damages because additional
land must be taken for use as access roads, existing rights of way rarely being of
sufficient width. This is especially true in cases of highway conversion under the
Federal Aid Highway Act, where a width sufficient to meet the approval of the
Secretary of Commerce is required. 72 Stat. 894 (1958), 23 U.S.C. § 109(b) (1958).
Where no land is taken, state constitutional distinctions arise. When the state constitution requires compensation only for taking of property, damage to land when no
land is taken has been termed "consequential," 2 NIcHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.4432
(1950), and in the absence of a specific statute authorizing payment of such damages,
compensation is generally denied. Id. at § 6.443211]. Where the constitutional provision is for taking or damaging, damages have been awarded. Id. at § 6.4432[2]. In
"taking-only" states, the question arises whether the taking of access alone is sufficient
to require payment for severance. Compare McGarrity v. Commonwealth, 311 Pa.
436, 166 AtI. 895 (1933), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question,
292 U.S. 19 (1934) (per curiam), with Mueller v. New Jersey Highway Authority,
59 N.J. Super. 583, 158 A.2d 343 (App. Div. 1960).
5 The formal definition of market value varies among jurisdictions, but the general rule is that it is the price a purchaser willing but not forced to buy will pay a
seller willing but not forced to sell. 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN
§ 20 (1953). This value is established through expert testimony ordinarily based on
one of three methods: market data (comparable sales, etc.), capitalization of income,
or reproduction costs adjusted for depreciation. Note, Valuation in California Condeinnation Cases, 12 STAN. L. Rxv. 766 (1960).
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In the gas station case, the Arkansas court viewed the state action as
a dual exercise of police power and eminent domain-the latter in taking
the land, the former in rerouting traffic. As no compensation need be paid
for detriment resulting from this legitimate exercise of the police power and
as alternate access was provided, compensation for impairment of access
was denied. But this conclusion rests principally on a facile labeling of the
state action, ignores the economic fact of defendants' loss, and does not
6
consider damage done to the remaining land by reason of the severance.
In the motel case, the Arizona court granted severance damages, computing
them on a before-and-after market value basis, and thereby compensating
for diversion of traffic. 7 The conceptual difference between the two lines
of reasoning derives from their definition of access. If access be considered
merely a license from the state that an owner may leave his property and
go elsewhere through the use of state highways, the reasoning in the gas
station case seems apt. If it be the right of an abutting owner to be reached
by the outside world (a specific easement in a particular highway whereby
a commercial value accrues to the land), the motel case analysis seems correct. Equally weighty policy considerations support each theory,8 but with
few exceptions 9 the courts have reached the motel case result.')
0

Another Arkansas case, decided the same day, shows a different approach. In
State Highway Comm'n v. Union Planters Nat'l Bank, 333 S.W.2d 904 (Ark. 1960),
the state highway commission had previously condemned a right of way bisecting
defendant's farm for use as a conventional four-lane highway and now sought to
condemn the underlying fee to convert the highway to limited access. It was admitted
that the fee underlying the existing easement was of only nominal value, but the trial
court awarded defendant $75,000 compensation in that he could no longer cross the
highway within the confines of his property but was forced to travel one-half mile north
or south on access roads, thereby rendering operation of his farm as a single unit impracticable. The Commission appealed, arguing that the loss was not compensable,
as it was the result of the exercise of state police power, and that any compensation
due had been paid in severance damages at the time of the original taking of the
right of way. The court rejected these contentions and affirmed. As the dissent
points out, the reasoning of this case is difficult to reconcile with Bingham, despite
the factual distinction that the property owner had land abutting both sides of the
highway. Id. at 915. This decision views the state action as exclusively eminent
domain and specifically refuses to reach the question of whether the same result could
be reached through exercise of state police power. Id. at 909.
7Where market value is used to measure compensation for access impairment,
it includes the commercial worth of the traffic and thus compensates for its diversion.
8 On the one side, the need for highway improvement is of growing national
concern and the addition of expenses which will not advance present improvement
programs, such as paying an abutter's business loss, could render such programs
prohibitively expensive. It is also argued that the commercial investor takes a
calculated risk and has no right to expect the constant maintenance of the status quo.
He is, or will be, on constructive notice of the state's right to condemn direct access
without compensation and his purchase price should reflect this risk. Conversely,
it is said that the abutting property owner has paid for his right of access in his
purchase and has relied on it in improving his property. To take such rights without
compensation may needlessly depress the value of commercial property and impede its
development. It is an economic fact that an abutter often loses not only his future
profit potential, but most of his capital investment made in reliance on the preservation of his easement. The taking of one property right without compensation, or the
elimination of one property right through redefinition, could be a dangerous inroad
into the preservation of property rights in general.
9 Muse v. Mississippi, 233 Miss. 694, 103 So. 2d 839 (1958) ; State v. Fox, 53
Wash. 2d 216, 332 P.2d 943 (1958).
10 See cases cited note 3 supra.
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The presently developed polar answers to the compensation problem
do not bar a third, middle-ground resolution of the competing demands of
constitutional requirements and economical highway construction. Such
a middle-ground resolution is based on the premise that the abutter has,
in addition to a license to use the state highways which he shares with the
general public, a license of direct access to the highway on which he is
located. The nature of the direct access license can be changed when the
abutter relies on it. When a licensee alters his position in reliance upon an
oral or implied license, it becomes irrevocable and its continuance will be
enforced in equity." Such an interest is in fact an easement, 12 and easements are compensable in eminent domain proceedings.13 The nature of
such an easement does not demand that compensation for its taking be based
on diversion of traffic away from the dominant tenement; rather it demands
only compensation based on that which created the easement 14-the re1l Miller v. Lawlor, 245 Iowa 1144, 66 N.W.2d 267 (1954) (oral agreement not
to obstruct view enforced when relied on); McCoy v. Hoffman, 295 S.W.2d 560
(Ky. 1956) (access to highway over promisor's land enforced against subsequent
purchaser); Magnuson v. Coburn, 154 Neb. 24, 46 N.W.2d 775 (1951) (highway
access relied on for motel business enforced against subsequent purchaser) ; Smallwood
v. Diz, 245 S.W.2d 439, 440 (Ky. 1952) (dictum); 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 429,
at 521 (1952); 5 RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY §§ 519(4), 524 (1944). The theory has
been criticized in CLARK, COVENANTS AND INTERESTS RUNNING WITH LAND 61-62
(2d ed. 1947), as an estoppel which penalizes the licensor for the very reason for
which he gave the license-so that the licensee might rely on it. It might further
be argued that the doctrine of governmental immunity from estoppel would thwart
the use of this theory in condemnation proceedings. But governmental immunity arises
chiefly in cases of unauthorized assurances on which reliance is placed. Berger,
Estoppel Against the Government, 21 U. CHL L. REv. 680 (1954). In the instant
context, the assurance arises from the state's holding of the roads in trust for public
use. Sauer v. New York, 206 U.S. 536, 554 (1906) (dictum).
12 The difference between an irrevocable license and an easement is one of semantics, since the privileges of both are the same. 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY § 429, at
521, 524 n.27 (1952). The right of an abutter to access to the highway has been
termed an easement appurtenant to his land. Historically, this was warranted since
the abutter had built the road, or later, had been assessed for its construction.
Modern courts have explained the existence of the easement as a natural right of
ownership. See People ex rel. Dept. of Pub. Works v. Russell, 48 Cal. 2d 189, 195,
309 P.2d 10, 14 (1957); Wenton v. Commonwealth, 335 Mass. 78, 80, 138 N.E.2d
609, 611 (1956) ; McMoran v. State, 345 P.2d 598, 599 (Wash. 1959). Or they have
simply stated that an abutter's right has always been an easement.
Is A somewhat analogous result has been reached regarding an abutter's right
to compensation in change-of-grade cases in Ohio. When an abutter has reasonable
grounds to believe that the grade of the road is established and relies on this by
improving his property, compensation for his damage from subsequent changes must
be paid by the state. Compensation is based on the market value of the land before
and after the grade change. State ex rel. McKay v. Kauer, 156 Ohio St. 347, 102
N.E.2d 703 (1951); Schimmelmann v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry, 83 Ohio St. 356, 94
N.E. 840 (1911); Crawford v. Village of Delaware, 7 Ohio St. 459 (1857); State
ex rel. Schiederer v. Preston, 166 N.E.2d 748, 751 (Ohio 1960) (dictum).
14 The measure of damages when an easement is taken is not the market value of
the right taken, but the damage to the dominant tenement attributable to the taking
of the easement and to the prospective use which the taker will make of it. 1 ORGEL,
VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN § 111, at 476 n.36 (1953). In the case of an
easement created by reliance, the damage to the dominant tenement attributable to
its loss is the amount of that reliance. The use of another measure would lead to
speculative figures, especially in the case of unimproved land. In the case of State
ex rel. Morrison v. Wall, 87 Ariz. 327, 350 P.2d 993 (1960), compensation was

1960]

RECENT CASES

liance of the abutter on his direct access license. 15 An abutter's reliance is
his capital investment in improvements to his land made with a view toward
continued direct access. In zoning-the only other exercise of state police
power to regulate land use-it has been held that a purchaser may not rely
on a prospective land use; 16 thus, the purchase price of the land itself need
not be considered a part of the abutter's reliance. 17 The amount of the
award should be computed by deducting the present market or salvage value
of the improvements from the depreciated capital investment in improvements, weighted for inflation "--or, in other words, from the reproduction
cost of the improvements less their present depreciation. 19 Thus, consonant with constitutional requirements, 20 compensation would be paid for
the property right taken and the costs of such compensation made com21
mensurate with that right.
awarded and affirmed for the impairment of access rights from unimproved land to
the highway. The computation of such an award seems necessarily speculative. In
its zeal to protect property rights, the court compensated for one that did not in fact
exist, as there had been no reliance by the abutter on his right of direct access.
15 Note that this formulation of the compensation base will not include the value
of traffic to the premises, inasmuch as the abutter relied not on traffic being there but
on traffic being able to be there-that is, his right of direct ingress and egress. And
note also that it draws the line of compensable injury at abutters since only they ever
had a direct access license on which to rely.
16 Such regulation has been found to be a valid exercise of state police power
which does not require compensation even though the individual loss may be great.
E.g., Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (value of unimproved land reduced from $10,000 an acre to $2,500 an acre as a result of residential
zoning) ; Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (brickyard potentially worth
$800,000 zoned residential reducing its value to $60,000).
17 The return of an owner's capital investment in improvements is an increasingly
popular method of elimination of nonconforming uses in zoning. Referred to generally
as elimination through amortization, the system consists of setting a reasonable life
for existing improvements that do not conform to zoning regulations and requiring
that they be eliminated within that specified period. 2 RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF
ZONING AND PLANNING 80-88 (3d ed. 1957); Note, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 91 (1953);
1951 Wis. L. REv. 685 (1951). This procedure has been approved by the courts
so long as the allotted life is reasonable. State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v.
Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929) ; State ex rel. Dema Realty Co. v. McDonald,
168 La. 172, 121 So. 613, cert. denied, 280 U.S. 556 (1929) ; Grant v. Mayor & City
Council, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1956); Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 4 N.Y.2d
553, 152 N.E.2d 42, 176 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1958); Town of Somers v. Camarco, 308
N.Y. 537, 127 N.E.2d 327 (1955) (found unreasonable). Contra, City of Akron v.
The system actually allows
Chapman, 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1953).
the owner to recoup his investment in improvements made in reliance on the status
quo, then eliminates his use without compensation for his land or for the damage
done to it by the limitation of its use.
18 Other severance damages not attributable to the loss of access such as physical
repairs and fencing, might be included in the value of the land taken, or in the aftertaking market value, depending on the formula used by the state. See note 4 supra.
If not so included, there should be a separate award for these damages.
19 This figure is a familiar one in the computation of insurance for income and
commercial properties, 3 RIcHARDs, THE LAW OF INsuaANCE § 502 (5th ed. 1952),
and returns to the investor the current worth of his investment.
20 All state constitutions, with the exception of North Carolina and New Hampshire, provide that just compensation or its equivalent shall be paid for the exercise
of eminent domain. In North Carolina and New Hampshire the same requirement
has been established by case law. 1 ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN § 1,
at 5 & n.5 (1953). The two newest states have similar constitutional provisions.
ALAsKA CoNsT. art. I, § 18; HAWAII CoNsT. art. I, § 18.
21 The cost of paying just compensation for access easements seems to have
influenced the Arkansas court in its denial of recovery for impairment of access in
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Petitioner, executor of decedent's estate, had elected under the optional
valuation provision of the Internal Revenue Code of 19391 to determine
the value of the gross estate for federal estate tax purposes as of one year
after the death of the decedent rather than as of the date of death. During
the intervening year, the Sun Oil Company, in which decedent had owned
some 10,000 shares of common stock, declared and issued a true stock
dividend at the rate of eight shares of common stock on each hundred of
common held.2 The executor excluded these shares from the valuation of
the gross estate. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined a
deficiency in the amount of the tax due on the market value of the dividend
shares. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, affirming the Tax
Court's decision 3 upholding the Commissioner's determination, held that
the shares were properly included in the gross estate. Schlosser v. Comnmissioner, 277 F.2d 268 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 28 U.S.L. WEEK
3379 (U.S. June 22, 1960) (No. 1025, 1959 Term; renumbered No. 165,
1960 Term).
The court's holding was grounded in what it saw as a logical extension
of Eisner v. Macom ber,4 where the Supreme Court held that stock dividends are not income within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment. The
Court's reasoning was that a stock dividend effects no change in the stockholder's proportionate interest in the corporation and, therefore, he receives
no immediately realized pecuniary benefit from it. In a later case, 5 however, the Court said that the Treasury Department and Congress had
interpreted its decision in Eisner v. Macomber too broadly and that the
holding should be limited to situations in which the proportionate interest
the gas station case. There it was said, "for us to hold that such a loss is compensable
would amount to erecting an almost intolerable barrier in the way of further construction of super-highways." 333 S.W.2d at 734. Payment for access rights based
on the amount of the reliance that created them would preserve constitutionally protected property and at the same time render this preservation less intolerable. See
note 8 supra.
IInt. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 3, § 811 (j), 53 Stat. 122 (now INT. Rxv.

1954, § 2032(a) (2)).

CODE OF

2 The financing of the dividend was accomplished within the corporate structure
by transferring $65 per share from the earned surplus account to permanent capitalization. An examination of the Tax Court's findings of fact would indicate that the
source of these funds was current earnings. See Estate of John Schlosser, 32 T.C.
262 (1959). But the court of appeals' opinion indicates that current earnings were
insufficient to cover both the stock dividend and also a cash dividend declared during
the same year, and that some accumulated surplus was used for this purpose. See
Schlosser v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 268, 269 (3d Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 28
U.S.L. WEEK 3379 (U.S. June 22, 1960) (No. 1025, 1959 Term; renumbered No. 165,
1960 Term). While in this case this factual dispute was immaterial to the holding,
under another analysis it would become crucial. See notes 14 and 15 infra and accompanying text.
S Estate of John Schlosser, 32 T.C. 262 (1959).
4252 U.S. 189 (1920).
5 Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936).
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of the stockholder remains unchanged. 6 In 1943 the Treasury directed a
frontal attack on Eisner v. Macomber, presenting the Court with an identical factual situation in Helvering v. Grifliths.7 A majority of the Court,
by some agile judicial footwork, turned the issue from one of constitutionality to one of statutory construction, reasoning that since Eisner v.
Macomber was law when the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 was enacted,8
Congress intended to tax stock dividends only to the limits of constitutionality as they were then thought to exist-that is, as stated by Eisner v.
Macomber. In this manner the constitutional attack was blunted before
reaching its objective-the overturning of the Macomber doctrine. There9
fore, while there is doubt that Macomber persists as constitutional doctrine,
it is clear that Griffiths perpetuated the proportionate interest rule as a statutory mandate of the 1939 Code. The court of appeals' reliance upon this
income tax doctrine is understandable in view of the paucity of legal guideposts in the corresponding area of estate taxation, where only two relevant
cases appear. One is Maass v. Higgins,'0 in which the Supreme Court held
that rents, interest, and cash dividends earned by the property of the estate
during the alternate valuation period are to be excluded from the valuation
of the gross estate. In the other, McGehee v. Commissioner," the Fifth
Circuit held that stock dividends declared out of current earnings on shares
of stock transferred in contemplation of death are not properly included
in the valuation of the gross estate.12 The court there found the doctrine
of Eisner v. Macomber unpersuasive 13 and chose to apply the so-called
6 Note, however, that the general rule that taxability under the sixteenth amendment is contingent upon a change in the shareholder's proportionate interest in the
corporation does not mean that all dividends declared in stock different in kind from
that held will be so taxable. Compare Helvering v. Sprouse, 318 U.S. 604 (1943)
(nonvoting common on both voting and nonvoting common), and Strassburger v.
Commissioner, 318 U.S. 604 (1943) (nonvoting preferred on common held by corporations single stockholder) (decided together with Sprouse), with Helvering v.
Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 241 (1937) (preferred on common) (dictum), and Koshland v.
Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 446 (1936) (common on nonvoting preferred) (dictum).
Compare Helvering v. Sprouse, supra, and Strassburger v. Commissioner, supra, with
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
7 318 U.S. 371 (1943). The factual situation involved the declaration of a stock
dividend to be paid in common stock by a corporation having only that type of stock.
8 See Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 22(a), 53 Stat. 9; int. Rev. Code of 1939,
ch. 1, § 115(a), 53 Stat. 46.
9 See, e.g., Lowndes, The Taxation of Stock Dividends and Stock Rights, 96 U.
PA. L. REv. 147 (1947); Rottschaeffer, Present Taxable Status of Stock Dividends
in Federal Law (pts. 1-2), 28 MINN. L. REv. 106, 163 (1944).
10 312 U.S. 443 (1941), reversing Saks v. Higgins, 111 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1940).
"1260 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1958), reversing Estate of Delia McGehee, 28 T.C. 412

(1957).

12McGehee is analogous to the instant case. Under the Int. Rev. Code of
1939, ch. 3, § 811(c), 53 Stat 121, gifts made in contemplation of death are valued
in the gross estate. The time of valuation, however, is not the date of the gift, but
the date of death (or the alternate valuation date, if chosen). Stock dividends declared between the date of the gift and the date of the valuation are therefore similar
to those declared during the one-year alternate valuation period. The present code
contains a similar provision. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 2035(a).
13 McGehee v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 818, 820 (5th Cir. 1958).
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"tracing" principle which seeks to determine, by looking to the source of
the funds underlying the stock dividend, whether the dividend represents a
14
If the
capitalization of income earned before or after decedent's death.
income was earned after the death, the value of the new stock is not
includable in the valuation of the estate on the theory that the decedent
15
had no interest in profits earned after his death.
The court in the instant case chose to transplant the Macomber analysis
from income taxation to estate taxation, rather than to extend the Maass
holding to cover stock dividends or to adopt the McGehee tracing approach.
This course is consistent with the approach, if not the conclusion, of the
Supreme Court in Maass. The Court there first determined that rents,
interest, and cash dividends from the property of the estate were income
and taxable as such. As a consequence, the Court reasoned, the same
receipts cannot be properly called capital assets for estate tax purposes
inasmuch as "while the Constitution does not forbid double taxation, the
6
The
intent to impose it upon a given receipt is not to be presumed."1
Court thereby achieved a harmonious interrelationship between income
and estate taxes, preventing double taxation on the one hand and tax
avoidance on the other. In essence, this is precisely the result obtained by
the Third Circuit in Schlosser. The court examined the stock dividend to
determine its taxability as income and found it not taxable under Macomber.
This being so, it found the dividend to be a capital asset of the estate and
properly includable in the valuation of the gross estate. Criticism, if any,
of this analysis lies in the extension of the often condemned Macomber
doctrine.17 The uneven treatment of individual taxpayers under the doctrine is not to be overlooked,18 but the court's adoption of another rule of
inclusion without consideration of the existing tax law might well have led
14 Such an approach would have made the seeming inconsistency of the Tax Court
and the court of appeals as to the funds underlying the dividend in the instant case
of great importance. See note 2 supra and note 15 infra.
15 See 260 F.2d at 820. It should be noted that the converse of this position
necessarily assumes some incident of estate tax significance in the corporation's accumulation of earnings during the lifetime of the stockholder. The Third Circuit, at
least, finds no such incident: "Admittedly, the recent undistributed earnings of the
corporation which underlay the stock dividend could be considered new property to
the corporation. But unless the corporate entity be ignored, such accessions to the
corporate estate benefit the stockholder only as an increase in the value of his stock."
Instant case at 269.
16 Maass v. Higgins, 312 U.S. 443, 449 (1941).
17 See articles cited note 9 supra.
1s The major criticism of Macomber is the uneven treatment which it fosters
among taxpayers. As Professor Lowndes points out, a stockholder feels neither richer
nor poorer because his proportionate interest has changed, and rightly so, because
such a change is not usually reflected in a change in the market value of the stock.
And it is the market, after all, to which the taxpayer has recourse if he finds it
necessary to dispose of some of his holdings to pay his income taxes. It seems unjust
that one taxpayer, having received an interest-changing dividend, must pay tax on it,
while another, who received a dividend which did not affect his interest, need not,
though the market value of the shares, which determines the amount of the tax, has
been similarly affected. See Lowndes, mupra note 9, at 154-57.
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to even greater unfairness. The analysis suggested by McGehee, for
example, while theoretically sound, could lead to such inequalities. 19
Since the 1954 Code retains the alternate valuation provision,2° the
effect of the decision may persist under that code. The new code, however,
differs from the 1939 Code 21 by eliminating the proportionate interest test
for determining the taxability of stock dividends as income. Section 305
excludes from taxation as income all stock dividends except those distributed in discharge of preference dividends and those distributed in lieu
of property at the election of the stockholder. 22 In applying the Schlosser
decision as precedent under the 1954 Code, the courts must decide whether
the Third Circuit's holding stands as an outright espousal of the Macomber
doctrine as an estate tax landmark for determining whether a stock dividend
is to be included in the valuation of the gross estate, or rather represents
a suggested analysis to be adapted to meet the change in status of stock
dividends under the income tax provisions of the 1954 Code. The former
would be a retrogressive step in equitable taxation in that it would merely
transplant the inequalities of Macomber,23 now uprooted in the income tax
field,24 to that of estate taxation. If, however, the decision is looked upon
by future courts as suggesting an analysis only, it will provide a sound and
logical basis for dealing with the problem of inclusion under the present
code. In the context of the 1954 Code, the Schlosser approach to stock
dividends declared during the alternate valuation period would include in
the valuation of the gross estate all stock dividends save those which are
taxable as income under section 305-that is, only preference dividends and
25
dividends elected in lieu of property distributions would be excluded.
This frankly pragmatic approach thus avoids the administrative problems
of the proportionate interest rule 26 and the difficulties of the "tracing" prin19 The McGehee analysis attempts to determine the source of funds underlying
the dividend. If those funds are income earned by the corporation since the decedent's
death, McGehee requires that the dividend be excluded from the valuation of the
gross estate. The case also contemplated in dictun a contrary result where dividends
have been financed out of funds existing when the decedent died. While on its face
this analysis seems clearly equitable, inequality appears when it is considered in conjunction with the income tax laws. For example, a stock dividend which is financed
out of current earnings but which also fails to change the proportionate interest of
the shareholder would not be taxed either as income or as a capital asset. On the
other hand, a dividend financed out of past surplus which changes the proportionate
interest of the stockholder would be taxed as both income of the estate and a capital
asset of it.
20 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2032 (a) (2).
21 "[A stock dividend] shall not be treated as a dividend to the extent that it
does not constitute income to the shareholder within the meaning of the Sixteenth
Amendment to the Constitution." Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 115(f) (1), 53
Stat. 47.
22 INT. 1v. CODk OF 1954, § 305.
23 See note 18 supra.
24 Compare INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 305, with Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1,
§ 115(f) (1), 53 Stat. 47.
25 The same result would follow in cases involving gifts in contemplation of death,
such as McGehee v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1958). See note 12 supra.
26 These problems appear to be the motivation for the change in the income tax
law under the 1954 Code. See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 241 (1954).
For some hypothetical situations illustrating these difficulties, see Rottschaeffer, supra
note 9, at 120-29.
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ciple advocated by McGehee.27 It embodies both the spirit of the Maass
decision, eschewing the overlapping of tax laws which leads to double
taxation, and the evident concern of the court in the instant case that both
income and estate taxes not be avoided. Viewed in this way, Schlosser
presents a sturdy foundation from which to approach the same problem
under the 1954 Code.

FAMILY LAW-DvoRCED FATHER MAY BE COMPELLED To Am
His MIIOR CHrLD IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MOTHER To OBTAIN
A COLTIG, EDUCATION

Pursuant to a divorce decree, plaintiff-wife was given custody of her
teenage daughter and defendant-husband was directed to contribute $50
a month toward the child's support. Subsequently, plaintiff sought to
modify the decree and increase the award so as to provide funds with which
the daughter might obtain a college education. The .daughter's aptitude
for college was undisputed and testimony tended to establish the father's
financial ability to provide for such an education and the mother's relative
inability in this respect.' The chancellor increased the original award to
$90 a month; the Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed, holding that
under the circumstances it was the duty of the father to provide funds for
the education of his minor child. Pass v. Pass, 118 So. 2d 769 (Miss.
1960).
Courts are divergent in their holdings as to whether a divorced father
2
will be compelled to provide funds for the college education of his children.
27
For a frank acknowledgement by a court of its inability to deal with a problem
requiring a similar analysis, see Cunningham Estate, 395 Pa. 1, 149 A.2d 72 (1959),
dealing with the century-old Pennsylvania rule of apportionment, first enunciated
in Earp's Appeal, 28 Pa. 368 (1857>.
1 Plaintiff's testimony as to the defendant's financial ability tended to establish
that defendant owned a farm capable of producing $12,000 in income yearly; in contradiction, defendant testified that he was heavily in debt and unable to increase the
original award. There is no recitation of the chancellor's reasons for deciding that
plaintiff was financially unable to send her daughter to college. See Pass v. Pass,
118 So. 2d 769, 770-71 (Miss. 1960).
2 Cases that have included college education as an element under a divorce decree
are: Maitzen v. Maitzen, 24 Ill. App. 2d 32, 163 N.E.2d 840 (1960) ; Refer v. Refer,
102 Mont. 121, 56 P.2d 750 (1936) ; Payette v. Payette, 85 N.H. 297, 157 AtI. 531
(1931) ; Cohen v. Cohen, 193 Misc. 106, 82 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Sup. Ct. 1948) ; Jackman
v. Short, 165 Ore. 626, 109 P.2d 860 (1941); Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244
Those which have rejected college as such an element can be
Pac. 264 (1926).
distinguished by the type of decisions rendered. One group seems to imply that a
college education is simply not important enough to be considered a necessary and
thus includable in a support decree. "[We have] no authority to require a parent to
provide funds to defray the expense of a general college education for a child."
Hachat v. Hachat, 117 Ind. App. 294, 296, 71 N.E.2d 927 (1947). "A general college
education, however desirable it may be, is not a necessary." Morris v. Morris, 92
Ind. App. 65, 68, 171 N.E. 386, 387 (1930). The other group emphasizes that in the
proper factual circumstances the education would be included in a support order.
"We do not accede to the contention that the court in any case is without power . . .
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Where such a requirement has been imposed, it has been justified either
through a liberal interpretation of a general welfare statute similar to the
Mississippi act involved in the instant case,3 or by labeling the education a
"necessary" and invoking the common-law rule of "necessaries." 4 The
Mississippi court adopted the former course and relied on two statutes,
one charging the mother and father with the "care, nurture, welfare, and
education" of their minor children 5 and the other authorizing the court
to make orders relating to the care and maintenance of children in divorce
actions. 6 The latter provision-like many state statutes pertaining to
divorce, custody, and support 7-emphasizes judicial discretion and has
been variously construed so as to annul the common-law doctrine of the
paramount right of the father to the custody of the children,8 to compel a
father to provide additional support funds when an unforeseen emergency
arises, 9 and to emphasize the general proposition that the best interests
of the child should be the prime consideration of the court.' 0 The alternative analysis-that a college education is a "necessary"-reasons from the
regardless of the relevant circumstances to require a parent to provide his child with
a college or vocational education. We are not persuaded, however . . . [to do this
in the present case]." Jonitz v. Jonitz, 25 N.J. Super. 544, 556-57, 96 A.2d 782, 788
(1953). "A rich man, well able to pay, might very well be held for a college education of an extended and expensive sort. However, the father in this instance is not
"
Golay v. Golay, 35 Wash. 2d 122, 124, 210 P.2d 1022, 1023
a rich man ....
(1949).
3
Miss. CoDE AN. § 399 (1956).
Maitzen v. Maitzen, 24 Ili. App. 2d 32, 36,
163 N.E.2d 840, 842 (1960), interpreted the words "make such order touching . . .
"care, custody and support of the children . . . as, from the circumstances of the
parties and the nature of the case, shall be fit, reasonable and just. . . .,"ILL. RFv.
STAT. ch. 40, § 19 (1959), to permit funds for a college education to be included in
the order. Luques v. Luques, 127 Me. 356, 358, 143 At. 263, 264 (1928), interpreted
"care, custody, and the support of any minor children," Me. Laws 1901, ch. 151,
at 167, to include funds for a musical education; Stoner v. Weiss, 96 Okla. 285, 286,
222 Pac. 547, 548 (1924), construed "custody, support, and education of the minor
children," OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1277 (Supp. 1956), so as to include funds for a
child's future education. Jackman v. Short, 165 Ore. 626, 638, 109 P.2d 860, 865 (1941),
interpreted "care and custody of the minor children and/or education thereof," Ore.
Laws 1921, ch. 114, at 225, to include funds for college. Present compulsory school
attendance laws-expressed in terms of age or completion of some minimum amount
of education--do not require a college education. See, e.g., A~iz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 15-321 (1956) (8 to 16 or completion of prescribed grammar school courses) ; PA.
13-1326 (1950) (8 to 17 or completion of accredited senior high
STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
school).
4 See notes 11-16 infra and accompanying text.

§ 399 (1956).
§ 2743 (1956).
ANN. § 65.14 (1943); OKLA.

5 Miss. CODE ANN.
6Miss. CODE ANN.

7E.g., FLA. STAT.
STAT. ANN. § 247.24 (Supp. 1960).

STAT. ANN.

tit. 12, § 1277 (Supp.

1959); Wis.

8
Cocke v. Hannum, 39 Miss. 423 (1860) (interpreting a substantially identical
statute).
9 Castleberry v. Castleberry, 214 Miss. 94, 58 So. 2d 67 (1952) (son seriously
injured playing football; daughter injured in automobile collision).
10 See Earwood v. Cowart, 232 Miss. 760, 765, 100 So. 2d 601, 603 (1958);
Haynie v. Hudgins, 122 Miss. 838, 857, 85 So. 99, 103 (1920); Duncan v. Duncan,
119 Miss. 271, 279, 80 So. 697, 701 (1918).
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common-law rule that a father is liable for necessaries furnished his child 11
even if the father is divorced and whether or not he has custody of the
child. 12 Courts seeking to classify college education as a necessary have
relied on the traditional relativity of the term, pointing out that it includes
in its scope not only physical essentials such as food and clothing but also
the conventional necessaries of others in the same circumstances as the
infant in question.'3 In determining whether a college education is a
necessary in any particular case, courts have been especially concerned with
the financial circumstances of the divorced parents and the aptitude of the
child. 14 While this judicial refinement of the necessary doctrine is illustrative of the manner in which courts can remold an old concept to fit new
situations, 15 it should be noted that the doctrine may also be used to avoid
consideration of the underlying merits of the individual case. 16
The humanitarian desire to help children obtain that which they would
have received were it not for their parents' marital failure 17 is apparent in
recent legislation and decisions. Decrees of support have been held to
survive the death of the parent,' 8 the age to which support may be required
1 Compare Middlebury College v. Chandler, 16 Vt. 683 (1844), wvith Luques v.
Luques, 127 Me. 356, 143 At. 263 (1928), and Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244
Pac. 264 (1926). See generally 4 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 234, at 56-57,
63 (1936).
12Alvey v. Hartwig, 106 Md. 254, 67 Atl. 132 (1907); Spencer v. Spencer, 97
Minn. 56, 105 N.W. 483 (1906) ; 2 SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION AND
DOMESTIC RELATIONS § 1912 (6th ed. 1921).
IsSee Jackman v. Short, 165 Ore. 626, 109 P.2d 860 (1941), 20 ORE L. REv. 377
(1941); Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 Pac. 264 (1926), 21 ILL. L. REv. 409
(1926).
14 See cases cited note 13 supra. Compare note 22 infra.

15 Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 Pac. 264 (1926), illustrates this remolding
and broadening process. There, the court found that the father was able to pay for
a college education, that the child displayed a particular aptitude for teaching, and
that the child's employment in another field was unlikely because of poor health.
Thus the court was confronted with a situation in which college appeared almost
essential if the child was ever to gain financial independence. The funds required
for college were granted, the court using a "necessary" analysis to reach this result.
See also Calogeras v. Calogeras, 10 Ohio Op. 2d 441, 163 N.E.2d 713 (Juv. Ct. 1959),
35 NovaRE DAME LAW. 573 (1960).
16 See Morris v. Morris, 92 Ind. App. 65, 171 N.E. 386 (1930) ; Hachat v. Hachat,
117 Ind. App. 294, 71 N.E.2d 927 (1947) (citing and relying on Morris without
further discussion) ; cf. Commonwealth v. Wingert, 173 Pa. Super. 613, 98 A.2d 203
(1953).
17 'When we turn to divorced parents . . . society can not count on normal
protection for the child . . . ." Maitzen v. Maitzen, 24 Ill. App. 2d 32, 38, 163
N.E.2d 840, 843 (1960). "The purpose of this provision [divorce statute] . . .
should be held to be to provide for minor children who are deprived of the care and
training that naturally flow from a united home .

.

.

."

Luques v. Luques, 127

Me. 356, 359, 143 Ad. 263, 265 (1928). "Parents, when deprived of the custody of
their children, very often refuse to do for such children what natural instinct would
ordinarily prompt them to do." Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 184, 244 Pac. 264,
167 (1926). Cf. 2 NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 15.63, at 276 (2d ed. 1945);
WEISSMAN, GUARDIANSHnIP FOR CIMLDREN 9-11 (1949).
I8 Taylor v. George, 34 Cal. 2d 552, 212 P.2d 505 (1949) ; Garber v. Robitshek,

226 Minn. 398, 401, 33 N.W.2d 30, 33 (1948)

(dictum); 26 TEMP. L.Q. 202 (1952).
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has been raised, 19 and a divorced father has even been compelled to provide
funds for the college education of his disabled adult child.2 0 In the same
vein, the role of a college education in the development of a child's full
potentialities cannot be seriously doubted. But to recognize the general
desirability of a college education is not to say that funds for such an
education should be included in every support order. In each particular
case, the court must look first to the child's aptitude; 2 1 and, if the child
is otherwise suited for college, it must then determine the proper amount
of contribution.2 2 Here, however, a possibility of abuse exists. Certainly
support decrees should not become vehicles for imposing-under the guise
of child welfare--punitive damages for the "crime" of divorce.2 3 Too
often divorce indicates to many people that the father must be at fault and
that any suffering should be borne by him. 24

Nor should a father be

burdened beyond his financial capacity.25 The possibilities of help from
the other parent, of scholarship aid, and of part-time employment should all
be considered in determining how much additional aid, if any, is needed.
The court must balance the earning capacity of the child against that of the
19 Maitzen v. Maitzen, 24 Ill. App. 2d 32, 163 N.E.2d 840 (1960) (divorce court
jurisdiction not limited to minor children) ; Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. art. 4639a (Supp.
1960) (raising jurisdictional age limit of divorce courts from 16 to 18).
20 Strom v. Strom, 13 Ill. App. 2d 354, 142 N.E.2d 172 (1957).
21
Courts considering whether to require a parent to provide funds for a college
education have almost always discussed the child's aptitude. See, e.g., Maitzen v.
Maitzen, 24 Ill. App. 2d 32, 163 N.E.2d 840 (1960) ; Jackman v. Short, 165 Ore. 626,
109 P.2d 860 (1941) ; Esteb v. Esteb, 138 Wash. 174, 244 Pac. 264 (1926) ; 20 ORE.
L. REV. 377, 383 (1941). A certain minimum amount of ability must be present before
higher education is appropriate for a given individual, but this requisite aptitude
should not be confused with an aptitude indicating a superior ability in relation to the
average college student. Such a higher standard of ability would deprive many able
students of financial aid.
22 Note that this analysis treats separately the desirability and feasibility of a
college education, first deciding the question of desirability solely on the basis of the
child's aptitude and then considering feasibility in terms of ability to pay. On the
other hand, the necessary analysis-by looking to what is happening to children in
families of similar financial circumstances-amalgamates both ability to pay and aptitude into a single issue of desirability. This distinction in analysis may become
important in at least two cases. First, where a child is found to be extremely gifted,
the strength of this aptitude factor may increase the court's willingness to find that
the father is able to pay for a college education; should the same situation be considered using a necessary analysis, the fact that only a few children similarly situate
are attending college may prove persuasive. And second, should a child be found to
be a borderline college admission case, this factor may outweigh even a proven
financial ability and be decisive that the child should not be sent to college; but under
the necessary analysis, if other wealthy children of mediocre intelligence are attending
college, the child of divorced parents would also receive a higher education.
23 Although it could be argued that in cases where the father is at fault there
might be a place for "punitive damages," it seems rather poor policy to make this a
meaningful distinction. Certainly it is irrelevant to the desirability of sending a
particular child to college and it seems ludicrous to send one child to college because the
father was at fault, but to deny higher education to another because the fault, if any,
was in the other spouse.
24 See generally Venters, Evils of Alimony, 36 LAw NoT-s 29 (1932).
25 Golay v. Golay, 35 Wash. 2d 122, 210 P.2d 1022 (1949) (order granting modification reversed as excessive); see 2 NELsoN, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 14.34,
at 43-44 (2d ed. 1945).
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parent to determine how the financial burden of college should be allocated.2 6
The ultimate guard against abuse, however, is the availability of the amending process whereby the court can reexamine the constantly changing
27
circumstances of the parties in question.

LABOR

MANAGEMENT

RELATIONS-NLRB

MAY

EQUATE PARTIAL STRIKE To HABASS EMPLOYER wIB FAmn
BARGAIx IN GOOD FATH

NOT
RE To

Upon termination of a collective-bargaining agreement, respondent insurance agents' union commenced certain harassing tactics designed to
induce the Prudential Insurance Company to accede to demands for a new
contract. These tactics included refusing to solicit new business, refusing
to comply with company reporting procedures when the writing of new
business was later resumed, refusing to participate in company sales promotion, reporting late to district offices and refusing to perform customary
duties while there, being purposely absent from special business conferences
arranged by the company, picketing and distributing leaflets, and soliciting
policyholders' signatures on petitions for presentation to the company.
Acting on Prudential's charge, the National Labor Relations Board found
that, in spite of negotiating at the bargaining table with apparent desire to
reach agreement on a contract, the union violated its obligation to bargain
in good faith under section 8(b) (3) of the Labor Management Relations
Act 1 by engaging in these harassing tactics. 2 The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, in a per curiam opinion,8 refused to enforce the
Board's order to cease and desist, citing a similar refusal in an earlier case.4
The Supreme Court affirmed, asserting that the Board's attempt thus to
regulate the use of economic weapons in the collective-bargaining process
26

The health, sex, age, and intelligence of the child would all be relevant to the
determination of how much the child might be expected to earn while attending
college.
27
E.g., Miss. CoDE ANN. § 2743 (1956) provides that "the court may afterwards,
on petition, change the decree, and make from time to time such new decrees as the
case may require." See NELsoN, op. cit. supra note 17, § 15.65. See also 2 VERNIER,
AmERPCAN FAMILY LAws § 106, at 274-76 (1932).
1 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(b) (3), 61 Stat. 140
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958).
2 Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 119 N.L.R.B. 768 (1957).

3 Insurance Agents' Int'l Union v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
4
Textile Workers Union v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 864 (1956) (Personal Products Case). This was the first attempt by the
Board to rule that partial strike tactics could be prohibited. In UAW v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949) (Briggs-Stratton Case), the Court
held that a state court could enjoin activity similar to that engaged in by the union
in the instant case. Under the then existing doctrine of preemption the implication
of the case was that the NLRB could neither prohibit nor protect the activity in
question, an implication which the Court in the instant case refused to weigh in
reference to this decision. Instant cse at 493 n.23.
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is contrary to the act's spirit of reliance on "free" collective bargaining.
NLRB v. InsuranceAgents' Int'l Union, AFL-CIO, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
Prohibitions under the Labor Management Relations Act-that is, activities in which employers and unions may not engage-are set out in general terms in section 8,5 leaving for the Board the determination whether,
in particular cases, the act has been violated. Section 8(a) (5) requires
that the employer bargain collectively with the representative of his employees; section 8(b) (3) places a reciprocal obligation on unions. "To
bargain collectively" is defined by section 8(d) as "the mutual obligation
of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
There appears to
other terms and conditions of employment .... "
be no clear standard in the section itself for determining when good faith
bargaining is taking place, and the usual attempt to formulate the concept
concludes by describing its opposite, "bad faith," as a desire not to reach
agreement.7 The case law, however, does not strictly adhere to a standard
which can be so characterized.8 Whether or not Congress envisaged precision in the language of the section, the Board has in reality exercised a
wide discretion in its application," and has come to rely on "per se" rules
equating certain activities with a failure to bargain in good faith. Thus,
refusal to enter into agreements on grounds that they do not contain certain proposals when the proposals are not mandatory subjects of bargain
ing,10 refusal to put a contract in writing," unilaterally increasing employee pay while negotiations for a new contract are in progress,'1 and
561 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958).
6

lbid.

7 NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131, 134 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied,

346 U.S. 887 (1953); Cox, The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARv. L. REv.
1401, 1417 (1958).
8
See NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 352 U.S. 938 (per curiam), reversing
235 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1956); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956);
Cox, supra note 7, at 1432-33.
9 Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion traces the history and development of this section.
For a more complete treatment, see Cox, supra note 7; Feinsinger, The National Labor
Relations Act and Collective Bargaining, 57 MicH. L. REv. 807 (1959) ; Smith, The
Evolution of the "Duty to Bargain" Concept in American Law, 39 MicH. L. REv.
1065 (1941). These writers apparently agree that whatever meaning "good faith
bargaining" has, that meaning has been acquired through a case-by-case method and
not from the very broad statutory language. But how far the Board should be allowed
to interfere in the collective bargaining process is still a subject of controversy.
There seems little doubt that the Board can make rules under the provisions of the
Labor Management Relations Act since § 6, 61 Stat. 452 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 156
(1958), states: "the Board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend,
and rescind, in the manner prescribed by the Administrative Procedure Act, such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter."

Cf. DAvis, ADniNisTRATVE LAw TExT § 15.04, at 276-77 (2d ed. 1959).

The question really becomes one as to what rules are necessary to carry out the
purposes of the act.
10 NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
11 H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941).
12 NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, Inc., 337 U.S. 217 (1949).
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withholding information deemed desirable in the bargaining process 13 have
become per se indicative of failure to bargain in good faith. Other Board
decisions subject to characterization as per se rules have been held unauthorized by the Labor Management Relations Act on the theory that the
Board must consider each case on its own merits in finding bad faith. 14
While section 8 enables the Board to prohibit certain employee activities, section 7 lays down in general terms employee activities which the
Board may protect from employer reprisals. 5 Guidelines for the Board's
case-by-case implementation of section 7 are provided by sections 13 and
501(2). Section 13 provides that "nothing in this subchapter, except as
specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere
with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the
limitations or qualifications, on that right." 16 "Strike" in turn is defined
by section 501(2) as any "concerted stoppage of work . . . and any con-

certed slowdown or other concerted interruption of operations by employees." 17 No other provision of the act tends to clarify the definition of
slowdowns or to remove them from protection.' 8 While the language
of these sections would seem to give very broad protection to concerted
activity, that protection has been somewhat restricted by judicial interpretation. Thus, employees who engage in a sitdown strike,' 9 whose activity
is unlawful under another statute, 20 or who strike in breach of contract 21
are not engaging in protected activity and may be discharged. Courts of
appeals,22 and in recent years the NLRB,2 have consistently held that
activities similar to the tactics in the instant case are not protected from
employer countermeasures.
In light of the Board ruling and the disposition by the circuit court,
the precise issue decided by the Court in the instant case is not entirely
13 NLRB v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 352 U.S. 938 (1956) (per curiam), reversing
235 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1956); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
14 NLRB v. American Natl Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952) ; cf. Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
15 Labor Management Relations Act § 7, 61 Stat 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157
(1958) : "Employees shall have the right . . . to engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. . .
16 61 Stat 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 163 (1958).
17 61 Stat 161 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 142 (1958).
s One type of activity that might be considered a form of slowdown or partial
strike, the "hot cargo" contract, has been outlawed by § 8(e) of the 1959 amendments
to the act. 73 Stat 525 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. 1959). See Mittenthal,
PartialStrikes and National Labor Policy, 54 MIcH. L. Rv. 71, 78-79 (1955).
19 NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939).
20 Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31 (1942).
21 NLRB v. Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939).
22 Home Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 159 F.2d 280 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 758 (1947); NLRB v. Indiana Desk Co., 149 F.2d 987 (7th Cir. 1945);
NLRB v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944); NLRB v. Condenser Corp.,
128 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1942) ; C. G. Conn, Ltd. v. NLRB, 108 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1939).
23Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1806 (1954); Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1547 (1954); Phelps Dodge Copper Prods. Corp., 101 N.L.R.B.
360 (1952).
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dear. The Board's refusal even to consider evidence of the union's desire
to reach agreement 24 or to evaluate the actual effect on the parties of the
particular harassing tactics in question supports the inference that it was
attempting to promulgate a per se rule of law equating partial strikes with
failure to bargain in good faith. If the Court is holding merely that
the Board cannot arrogate to itself under section 8(b) (3) the broad power
categorically to prohibit partial strikes,25 the decision finds adequate
foundation in the broad purposes of the Labor Management Relations Act.26
While the Court has tolerated some interference in the collective bargaining
process by way of Board "per se!" rules 2 -- interference not entirely supportable by the "bad faith" finding 2 8 -a Board per se rule in the instant
case would go considerably further in interfering in the process, through
control of economic weapons, than has previously been sanctioned. Support for the Court's result can also be found in two sections of the act,
13 and 501(2) ,2 which the majority declined to consider. Inasmuch as
it is arguable that the union's activity in the instant case may be protected
from employer countermeasures under these apparent caveats to section 7,30 it seems clear that the activity cannot be categorically prohibited.
24

The Board stated: "[T]he fact that the Respondent continued to confer with
the Company and was desirous of concluding an agreement does not alone establish
that it fulfilled its obligation to bargain in good faith .

.

.

."

119 N.L.R.B. at 771.

25 There is some evidence in the opinion that this is all the Court intends to do.
The Court says: "the only apparent basis for the conclusion that the union was only
going through the 'motions' of bargaining is the Board's own postulate that the tactics
in question were inconsistent with the statutorily required norm of collective bargaining, and the Board's opinion, and its context, reveal that this was all that it
meant." Instant case at 482-83 n.5. And again: "we think the Board's resolution
of the issues here amounted not to a resolution of interests which the Act had left
to it for case-by-case adjudication, but a movement into a new area of regulation
which Congress had not committed to it." Instant case at 499.
26 justice Brennan's opinion for the Court does not rest its holding on any specific
language of the act. After tracing the history and evolution of § 8(b) (3) and its
counterparts, and recognizing that tensions exist between the principle of "free bargaining" and "good faith bargaining," the opinion concludes that the act does not
authorize such a sweeping interference with a union's right to exert economic pressure
as the Board attempted. The Court said: "And if the Board could regulate the choice
of economic weapons that may be used as part of collective bargaining, it would be
in a position to exercise considerable influence upon the substantive terms on which
the parties contract." Instant case at 490. This, the Court concludes, would be
inimical to the purposes of the act.
27 See notes 10-13 .supra and accompanying text.
28 See notes 8, 13 supra and accompanying text.
29 61 Stat 151, 161 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 142, 163 (1958). There is language in
the Briggs-Stratton Case, 336 U.S. at 258-63, see note 4 supra, to the effect that
§ 501(2) applies only to "strike" as used in § 8(b) (4) of the 1947 amendments to
the act. Justice Brennan apparently accepts this view, instant case at 493 n.23, and
it seems plausible in terms of the spirit of the 1947 amendments. On the other hand,
Justice Frankfurter disagrees with this interpretation of Briggs-Stratton, believing
that the issue was not settled by that case. Instant case at 510-11 n.6 (separate
opinion). Justice Frankfurter further says: "Nor is it valid to assume that all conduct loosely described as a 'slowdown' has the same legal significance

....

"

Instant

case at 512 n.8 (separate opinion).
30 The Court specifically left open the question of protection under §§ 7, 13 and
501(2). Instant case at 492-94 nn.22-23.
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In a separate opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, joined by Mr. Justice
Harlan and Mr. Justice Whittaker, indicated his belief that the Court
has gone further than merely striking down a per se rule and has held
that a partial strike may not even be evidence of bad faith bargaining. Justification for this inference can be found in some of the Court's language, 31
in the circuit court holding which the Court affirmed,3 2 and in the Board
opinion.33 But the Court's circumspection in narrowing its holding in other
respects-notably its avoidance of the protection problem under sections 7,
13, and 501 (2), 3 4 and of the problems of state jurisdiction raised by UAW
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd.35-indicates that it has done no
more than rule that the Board may not promulgate a per se rule categorically prohibiting the union's use of the partial strike as an economic
weapon. Nonetheless, the separate opinion is interesting and instructive
as a guide to the law's development in this area. Reasoning that the Board
can 'draw the conclusion of bad faith only from all of the circumstances
surrounding the union activity, these Justices would allow the Board to
consider a partial strike as one link in a chain of evidence supporting a bad
faith finding.3 6 Neither the Labor Management Relations Act nor any
prior Supreme Court decision has dealt with the problem of strikes, or
partial strikes, as evidence of bad faith. The separate opinion's approach
to the problem on a conceptual "evidence" level would not directly conflict
with existing law, although, inasmuch as it envisages a greater role on the
part of the Board in settling differences between labor and management,
it might entail some revision of traditional understanding of the act. Mr.
Justice Frankfurter defends this greater interference by conceiving the
ultimate purpose of the act to be withdrawal from reliance on pure eco37
nomic force in the collective bargaining process.
31 "The reason why the ordinary economic strike is' not evidence of a failure to
bargain in good faith is . . . [because] there is simply no inconsistency between the
application of economic pressure and good-faith collective bargaining." Instant case
at 494-95, quoted in concurring opinion at 504. Furthermore, the Court adopts the
Board's statement of the issue: "'The issue here . . . comes down to whether the
Board is authorized under the Act to hold that such tactics . . . support a finding
of a failure to bargain in good faith as required by Section 8(b) (3)." Instant case
at 483.
32 The circuit court opinion in the instant case was per curiam, relying on their
opinion in an earlier case. See notes 3, 4 supra and accompanying text. In the
PersonalProducts Case, on which the circuit court relied, it was more apparent than
in the instant case that the Board's finding was based on the evidence as a whole
rather than on a per se rule. The circuit court said: "[N]o inference of a failure to
bargain in good faith could have been drawn from a total withholding of srvices ....
It is equally clear that no such inference can be drawn from a partial withholding of
services . . . ." 227 F.2d at 410.
33 There is also some indication that the Board was treating the harrassing
tactics in an evidentiary fashion. The Board's opinion states: "Contrary to the
Respondent's contention, we rely on the harassing tactics solely as evidence of the
Respondent's bad-faith dealings with the Company and not as independently constituting unfair labor practices." 119 N.L.R.B. at 771 n.9.
S4

See note 30 supra.

85 336 U.S. 245 (1949). See note 4 supra.
36 Instant case at 504-05 (separate opinion).
87 Instant case at 507-08 (separate opinion).

19601

RECENT CASES

The practical difference between Mr. Justice Frankfurter's view on the
"evidence" problem and the position he attributes to the Court is not immediately apparent. Essentially it seems to be a difference in approach, the
Frankfurter view affording a means by which the Board may expand its
power in the area of partial strikes-a desirable if not inevitable result.
"Partial strike" is a broad label covering a conglomeration of activities
which ranges from the traditional slowdown to the refusal to cross picket
lines.38 As it would be undesirable to treat all such activities in the same
manner, the Board needs wide discretion in dealing with what may be
labeled "partial strikes": perhaps protecting some activities under the
"concerted activities" language of section 7,39 prohibiting others as indicative of "bad faith" under section 8(b) (3), and leaving still others to
the arena of economic warfare or control by the states.40 Proper classification requires treatment on a case-by-case basis. If Mr. Justice Frankfurter is correct in asserting that'the Court held that partial strikes may
never be evidence of bad faith it seems to follow that the Board could never
prohibit a partial strike. The Frankfurter view, on the other hand, implies
power in the Board to prohibit such tactics in some, as yet undefined,
circumstances. In this respect, the Frankfurter view on the evidence issue
would be preferable since it allows flexibility in treating the partial strike
phenomenon. A careful reading of the Court's opinion, however, leaves
doubt that it has been correctly characterized as banning Board consideration of partial strikes as evidence of failure to bargain in good faith. It
appears, in fact, that the majority's disposition of the case fosters, rather
than discourages, a case-by-case treatment of partial strikes in that it
demands careful NLRB consideration of each case on its own merits.

RESTRAINT OF TRADE-Tw

"Y-YA. COAL.REQUIREMENTS
CONTRACT HLD INVAIn) UNDER Cn&YTo ACT SECTIoN 3

Tampa Electric Company, a regulated private power firm, contracted
with the Potter Towing Company, a Tennessee coal producer, for its total
requirements of coal over a twenty-year period to fuel a new power plant
then scheduled for immediate construction.' The contract represented the
first large-scale attempt to introduce coal into the oil-dominated Florida
boiler fuel market. The amount of coal to have been purchased during the
first year of the contract would have equalled the current yearly requirements of all other Florida consumers combined. Both parties expended
See instant case at 512 n.8 (separate opinion).
39 See Mittenthal, supra note 18, at 97.
40 See note 4 supra and text accompanying notes 19-23 supra.
38

1 Relevant provisions of the contract are set out in the text of the court~s opinion.
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 276 F.2d 766, 769 (6th Cir.), cert. granted,
363 U.S. 836 (1960) (No. 931, 1959 Term; renumbered No. 87, 1960 Term).
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large sums preparing to carry out the contract, but when the first coal was
due, seller's successor in interest 2-- claiming that the contract violated section 3 of the Clayton Act 3 and thus freed seller from all obligation to perform under it-refused delivery. Buyer brought a declaratory judgment
action in a federal district court seeking to have the contract declared valid
and enforceable. Deciding the case upon cross-motions for summary judgment supported by undisputed affidavits, the district court ruled in favor
of the defendant-seller, holding that the contract, because of its great duration and dollar volume, violated section 3 of the Clayton Act and could not
be enforced.4 The court of appeals affirmed on substantially the same
grounds. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 276 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.),
cert. granted, 363 U.S. 836 (1960) (No. 931, 1959 Term; renumbered No.
87, 1960 Term).
The draftsmen of the Clayton Act sought to strengthen earlier antitrust legislation by specific condemnation of certain business practices
thought beyond the reach of the broadly phrased Sherman Act of 1890. 5
Section 3 of the act 6 is directed against exclusive dealing contracts 7_
including "requirements" contracts, where the condition not to compete
is implicit rather than express.8 The condemnation of such contracts under
section 3 would require relatively little judicial construction were it not
2
After the signing of the contract, the interest of the original seller passed to
appellee Nashville Coal Co. and ultimately to appellee West Kentucky Coal Co. The
latter company guaranteed buyer against any loss through nonperformance.
3 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958). Seller also alleged a violation by
the contract of the Sherman Act §§ 1, 2, 26 Stat 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1, 2 (1958). Because of its disposition of the case under the Clayton Act, the
district court did not reach the question of violation under the earlier law.
4 Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 168 F. Supp. 456 (M.D. Tenn. 1958),
aff'd, 276 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 363 U.S. 836 (1960) (No. 931, 1959
Term; renumbered No. 87, 1960 Term).
5 See Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346, 355-56 (1922);
H.R. REP. No. 1168, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1914).
6 "It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use,

consumption, or resale within the United States . . . , or fix a price, charged there-

for, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors
of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or
such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15
U.S.C. § 14 (1958).
7 H.R. REP. No. 1168, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1914).
8 Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949), is the leading
case in which the Supreme Court passed on the validity of "requirements" contracts
under § 3. The Court ignored the absence of any "condition, agreement or understanding that the . . . purchaser . . . shall not use or deal in the goods . . . of
a competitor . . . ." See note 6 supra. The holding in the case assumed without

explicitly deciding the question that the distinction between "requirements" contracts
and "exclusive dealing" contracts is verbal and irrelevant The Court averred that
"it cannot be gainsaid that observance by a dealer of his requirements contract with
Standard does effectively foreclose whatever opportunity there might be for competing suppliers to attract his patronage .

.

.

."

337 U.S. at 314.
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for the final, or "qualifying," clause: 9 "It shall be unlawful . . . [to make
the enumerated types of contracts] where the effect may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce." This clause precludes per se condemnation of the enumerated
contracts and appears to require courts to hear economic evidence relevant
to the impact of such contracts upon competition.10 But the Supreme
Court, in Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States,11 held that the demands of the clause are satisfied "by proof that competition has been foreclosed in a substantial share of the line of commerce affected." 12 This
test-while making unnecessary economic evidence of a given contract's
effect upon competition and considering irrelevant whether that effect is
beneficial or detrimental to business-does specifically call for "proof" that
some foreclosure of competition has occurred in the "line of commerce
affected." This proof involves a showing of relevant market-the "area
of effective competition" in terms of both geography and products-- 1 3 and
9 Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether
Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARv. L. REv.

913, 915 (1952).

10 The intent of Congress in adding this clause is far from clear. In passing the
bill which later became the Clayton Act, the House refused to accept any limiting
discretionary provision such as the "qualifying" clause which, it was said, would only
give courts an excuse for leniency towards monopolists. Instead it passed a section
which flatly prohibited the transactions enumerated in the present § 3 and provided
criminal sanctions against them. See H.R. RE.'. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1914).
The Senate, on the other hand, refused to adopt sanctions against any transaction
except "tying" contracts. See 51 CONG. IZc. 14273-76 (1914). It was thought that
other offenses would better be left to the discretion of the projected Federal Trade
Commission. From conference emerged the present § 3 with its ambiguous "qualifying" clause unexplained in the conference report. H.R. REP. No. 1168, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1914). The narrow purpose of the Clayton Act to close specific gaps in the
Sherman Act is blurred by a compromise qualification which seems to revive the
broad "rule of reason" adopted by the Supreme Court in first construing the 1890
law in Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1910). For a
concise summary of the entire legislative history of § 3, see Schwartz, Potential Impairment of Competition--The Impact of Standard Oil Co. of California v. United
States on the Standard of Legality Under the Clayton Act, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 10, 21
n.40 (1949).
11337 U.S. 293 (1949).

Id. at 314.
13 Relevant market has figured prominently in three recent Supreme Court cases.
Two dealt with violations of the Sherman Act and upheld district court findings of
relevant market based on extensive economic evidence. United States v. E. I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (the Cellophane Case); International
Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959). In the third the Court ignored
an extensive record dealing largely with conspiracy under the Sherman Act, reversed
a district court decision for defendant based on a finding of no conspiracy, and held
against defendant on the basis of stock acquisitions in violation of § 7 of the Clayton
Act. A finding of relevant market was necessary to this holding, and, as the district
court had not considered the issue, the Court made the finding itself. United States
v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) (the General Motors Case).
The Cellophane Case establishes a test for district courts in their finding of relevant
market: "The 'market' . . . will vary with the part of commerce under consideration.
The tests are constant. That market is composed of products that have reasonable
interchangeability for the purpose for which they are produced-price, use and qualities
considered." Cellophane Case, supra at 404. International Boxing Club v. United
States, supra at 249-50, confirmed and applied the test in affirming a lower court
decision. The General Motors Case, however, ignored the Cellophane Case and its
test. In their desire to sunder the industrial giants Du Pont and General Motors,
12
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of effective foreclosure of that market by the suspect contract. A finding of
relevant market is, then, a precondition to a finding of violation of section
3, for substantial foreclosure under the Standard Oil test "can be determined only in terms of the market affected." 14
1
The instant case involved a contract of substantial size and length. '
Both the district court and the court of appeals seemed unfavorably impressed by the possible effect of such a sizable contract on a depressed coal
industry in which many producers compete actively for the patronage of
large power companies. 16 But size, in the context of section 3, is a relative
concept: a contract is illegal only if the business volume it forecloses is
substantial within the "line of commerce affected." And what line of
commerce is affected is a question of fact, properly resolved at the trial
level 17 by findings based on extensive economic evidence.' 8 The record
of the instant case, however, contains little that throws light on such
line-of-commerce questions as the interchangeability of oil and coal and the
the majority of four handled the issue of relevant market in cursory fashion: "The
record shows that automotive finishes and fabrics have sufficient peculiar characteristics
and uses to constitute them products sufficiently distinct from all other finishes and
fabrics to make them a 'line of commerce' within the meaning of the Clayton Act!'
General Motors Case, supra at 593-94. Dissenting, Mr. Justice Burton criticized the
majority's finding: "[T]here are no findings of fact dealing with the relevant market.
Also, the record appears deficient on such crucial questions as the characteristics of
the products, the uses to which they are put, the extent to which they are interchangeable with competitors' products, and so on. For these reasons I believe the
Court in any event should remand the case to the District Court to give the District
judge, who is more familiar with the record than we can be, an opportunity to review
the record . . . . By declining to remand, the Court necessitates a scrutiny here
of this huge record for determination of an essentially factual question not passed on
by the District Court, and not thoroughly briefed or argued by the parties." General
Motors Case, mpra at 649 n.30. The Cellophane Case and the General Motors Case
stand for two divergent ways of approaching the relevant market issue: the former
indicates how broad a relevant market a district court may properly find when the
record contains sufficient supporting economic data, while the latter shows how narrowly a court may construe relevant market in order to further policy ends when there
is little supporting evidence in the record. Thus, though reflecting divergent philosophies, the two cases are not clearly contradictory.
14 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1957).
15 "Using the estimated 1,000,000 tons for 1961 as the average annual purchases
during the twenty year life of the contract, the total dollar pre-emption over the life
of the contract at the minimum price of $6.40 per ton would amount to $128,000,000.00.
This is, of course, not insignificant or insubstantial." Instant case at 772.
16 For congressional recognition of the extremely depressed condition of the
bituminous coal industry and the role of electric utilities as potential new markets,
see Coal-Productionand Conservation, S. REP. No. 1494, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
17 See International Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 249-53 (1959) ;
United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 378-80 (1956);
United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 649 (1957) (dissent);
cf. Reply Brief for Appellant, instant case, p. 23: "The market affected by this contract of course is not the Gannon Station. It is the entire 'area' within which there is
'effective competition' between other sellers of boiler fuel and appellees. . . . The
question is one of fact: the 'relevant market' here is the boiler fuel market, and not
the coal market."
18 See United States v. International Boxing Club, 150 F. Supp. 397 (S.D.N.Y.
1957), aff'd, 358 U.S. 242 (1959); United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
118 F. Supp. 41 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
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geographical area of effective competition. 19 The district court, in limiting
the relevant market to the sales of a fungible within a single state, resolved
on summary judgment a crucial fact issue which had not been adequately
presented to the court. This resolution ignored both the obvious competition between coal and oil for the boiler fuel market and also the wider
market for the seller's coal throughout the southeastern United States; 2
instead it was based upon two boundaries which, if not economically
realistic, at least had the virtue of being so obvious as to be susceptible of
judicial notice. 21 And having made its finding of relevant market, the
district court went on to apply Standard Oil's quantitative substantiality
test-the use of size alone as a criterion for satisfying the qualifying clause
without recourse to evidence of actual monopolistic tendencies. 22 But while
39 The record contains the complaint and answer, the disputed contract in haec
verba, and the transfer of interest to the appellee. It contains the cross motions for
summary judgment. Seller's motion is supported by an affidavit and attached exhibit
showing that subsequent to the breach the buyer entered a new contract for purchase
of coal from a competing producer and that the new contract is subject to cancellation
upon twelve months' notice or immediately if seller begins to perform under the
disputed contract. Buyer's motion for summary judgment is supported by two
affidavits. The first presents the background facts; attached to it is an exhibit showing that the buyer had entered negotiations with one Peabody Coal Co. for coal to
be used after conversion of one of its oil burning plants. The second affidavit offers
brief indication that oil prices had been reduced in response to the projected conversion from oil to coal. It also indicated that atomic power would soon be used
as a fuel competing with both coal and oil. The thrust of these affidavits is to support
the buyer's contention that the relevant market in this case is boiler fuels, not coal
alone, and that within this larger market the disputed contract does not effectively
foreclose competition. Record, passim.
20 The district court (as well as the Supreme Court, in United States v. E. I.
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 594 n.13 (1957)) cited, out of context, the
following words as authority for its narrow market holding: "The phrase 'in any
line of commerce' is comprehensive and means that if the forbidden effect or tendency
is produced in one out of all the various lines of commerce, the words 'in any line of
commerce' literally are satisfied." George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can
Co., 278 U.S. 245, 253 (1929). That case, however, dealt in no way with the problem
of relevant market. Defendant can company had, by price discrimination, enabled a
competitor of Van Camp to gain a dominance in the canned food industry. Can
company's "line of commerce" was the sale of metal containers. It defended on the
ground that the Clayton Act prohibited discrimination only in the line of commerce
in which a defendant is actually engaged. In holding can company had violated § 2
of the Clayton Act, the Court said the words of the section were fulfilled "if the
forbidden effect or tendency is produced in one out of all the various lines of commerce." Id. at 253. And the court of appeals in the instant case noted only: "It is
true that coal and oil are competitive fuels. . . . But for purposes of section 3 of
the Clayton Act, we believe that each is to be treated as a separate, defined subdivision
of the fuel industry generally." Instant case at 772. To support this conclusion it
cites only Van Camp and the General Motors Case. Cf. Brief for Petitioner in the
Supreme Court, pp. 39-42, in which the buyer presents at that level considerable
economic evidence of a broad boiler fuel market.
21The instant case, it must be remembered, was one upon a contract, rather
than a full-scale antitrust prosecution. As is evidenced by the cross-motions for
summary judgment, neither party wished to present the kind of extensive economic
evidence which characterized such litigation as the Cellophane Case. It is hardly
to be expected that here antitrust issues--even relevant market-would receive the
detailed attention at the trial level which a prosecution under the antitrust laws would
necessitate. See Wood, Unenforceable Contracts and Other Consequences, in ANq

ANTIRUST HANDBOOK 567 (1958).
22 See notes 11-14 supra and accompanying

text.
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Standard Oil was good precedent for ignoring evidence of the peculiar
suitability of a requirements contract to the public power industry or the
beneficial effect upon competition of introducing coal into an area long
dominated by oil,23 there was no precedent for a finding of relevant market
on summary judgment. 24
The court of appeals-having before it essentially the same record as
did the trial court-legitimized the district court's use of "quantitative substantiality" by interpreting United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &
Co. (the General Motors Case) 25 so as to permit an arbitrary finding of
relevant market based essentially on judicial notice. But the finding of
relevant market in the General Motors Case was not a central holding but
26
only a means to a policy end under section 7 -- the elimination of the
potential threat to competition created when one giant of industry acquires
substantial stock in another. 27 The policy of section 3, evoked by the court
of appeals, hardly requires the condemnation of a contract freely entered
into by parties of ordinary size where that contract has not been shown
See Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 307-12 (1949).
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947), is the only leading
case under the Clayton Act to have been decided and affirmed on summary judgment.
In that case, the defendant salt company admitted the use of contracts "tying" purchases of salt to the rental of patented salt processing machines. It also admitted
selling $500,000 worth of salt under these contracts. The Government then moved
for summary judgment which was granted. The Supreme Court rejected arguments
by the company that despite the use of the proscribed contracts, competition had not
been lessened, and eliminated any factual dispute over the issue of impact on competition by holding the entire issue irrelevant. The issue of relevant market was not
important in the case for two reasons. First, the geographical market was clear.
Defendant was "the country's largest producer for industrial uses," id. at 394, and
operated throughout the United States. And there was no indication of any substitute
for salt as the relevant product. Second, the case dealt with "tying" contracts which
"serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition." Standard Oil Co.
of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06. Use of these contracts amounted to
abuse of patent, and little evidence was demanded to support a government prosecution.
The willingness of the courts to hold such practices illegal without regard to economic
factors is shown by the holding that $500,000 is a "substantial" volume of business
without mention of market percentages. The presence of "tying" contracts and patent
abuse in International Salt serves to distinguish that case from the instant one and
explains the absence in the former of any discussion of relevant market. Cf. Standard
Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, supra, in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter disposed of
contracts for tires and other commodities which comprised only 2% of the relevant
market-hardly a "substantial foreclosure"-by noting "in passing that the exclusive
supply provisions for tires, tubes, batteries, and other accessories which are part of
some of Standard's contracts with dealers who have also agreed to purchase their
requirements of petroleum products should perhaps be considered, as a matter of
23
24

classification, tying rather than requirements contracts." Id. at 305 n.8. As such
they are subject to condemnation per se without serious consideration of their relation
to the relevant market
The "test' suggested in the General Motors Case is:
25353 U.S. 586 (1957).
"[A]utomotive finishes . . . have sufficient peculiar characteristics and uses to constitute them products sufficiently distinct from all other'finishes . . . to make them
a 'line of commerce' within the meaning of the Clayton Act." Id. at 593-94. See
also note 20 supra.
(now Clayton Act § 7, as
26 Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat 731 (1914)
amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
27 See Schwartz, New Approaches to the Control of Oligopoly, 109 U. PA. L. REv.
31, 37-38 (1960).
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to foreclose a substantial portion of an actual, proven market.28 Such a
realistic market was not proved and, as a result, the defendant's motion for
summary judgment was prematurely sustained.29 The effect of this premature action is virtually to eliminate from section 3 the demands of the
qualifying clause. Any line of commerce can be shown to be "foreclosed
in a substantial share" if the limits of the line are drawn narrowly enough.
Size alone thus becomes the sole criterion for violation of the section. In
fact, the district court said: "A contract to supply the total coal requirements of an operation of such magnitude for such a protracted exclusionary
period clearly falls within the purview of the statute." 8 0 And the court of
appeals confirmed: "A 'requirements' contract of some companies over a
short period of time might well avoid the effect proscribed by the statute,
while such a contract of large proportions and extending over a long
period of years would clearly fall within the provisions of the statute." 3 1
The very real problem of relevant market is unjustifiably ignored, leaving
the holding of violation under section 3 without necessary support.
28 "In Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States . . . the Court held
. . . that it was the purpose of Section 3 to remove a potential clog on competition
wherever, were it to become actual, it would impede a substantial amount of competitive activity." Instant case at 772.
29 Cf. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 157 F. Supp. 877, subsequent
findings and opintion, 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). In this case the court stated
that the government's burden of proof in establishing a violation of § 7 involved a
showing of both "line of commerce" and "section of the country." 157 F. Supp. at
879. The court denied the government's motion for summary judgment on the grounds
that the issues involved were too complex and far reaching for summary disposition.
30
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 168 F. Supp. 456, 458 (M.D. Tenn.
1958).
31 Instant case at 771.

